Beyond the “Gen Z Revolt”:

Youth, Inequality, and the Politics of Aspiration in Nepal

by Sourav Goswami

The recent turbulence in Nepal—sparked ostensibly by restrictions on social media and symbolized by the so-called “Gen Z protests”—has been interpreted alternately as an eruption of mass frustration with corruption and governance failure, or as another episode in the global repertoire of Western-influenced “color revolutions.” Yet both frames miss the deeper paradox: Nepal has, since the republican transition in 2008, achieved remarkable reductions in poverty and inequality by global standards. What persists is not destitution, but rather youth unemployment and the mismatch between aspirations and opportunities. This essay explores the structural roots of Nepal’s crisis, situating it within debates on inequality, social change, and the politics of youth expectation. It argues that Nepal’s political crisis is not simply an index of poverty, nor reducible to foreign intrigue, but a reflection of the contradictory terrain where material improvement coexists with political disillusionment and aspirational conservatism.

From Monarchy to Republic: The Paradox of Progress

Nepal’s monarchy oversaw one of the most unequal trajectories in South Asia. The consumption Gini coefficient rose from 30.1 in 1984 to 43.8 in 2003—a level comparable to Latin America’s most unequal societies (World Bank, 2006). With the abolition of monarchy in 2008, inequality fell sharply: by 2010 the Gini had declined to 32.8, and by 2022 it reached 30—a decline of 14 points in under two decades. By global development standards, this constitutes an extraordinary achievement. The poverty headcount ratio at the $3 (2021 PPP) benchmark fell from 55.7% in 2003 to just 2.4% by 2022. (See figure 1).

Figure 1: Poverty headcount ratio (2021 PPP) (% of population)

This near-eradication of extreme poverty, alongside rising electrification, improved health access, and declining child mortality, reflects the material gains under successive governments—whether led by Oli, Prachanda, or Deuba. Yet this narrative of progress coexists with youth revolt. Neither “increasing inequality” nor “growing poverty” can explain the present unrest. Instead, the crisis points to an enduring structural blind spot: persistent youth unemployment of around 20% since the 1990s (ILO, 2024)  and Gini Coefficeint based on income inequality have increased over time. In 2010/11, Nepal had one of the highest income Gini Coefficients in the world at 0.49 and it increased to 0.58 in 2019/20. This shows growing income inequality in Nepal (Oxfam Report: Fighting Inequality in Nepal, 2019). 

The Politics of Aspiration

Unemployment in Nepal is not new. What is new is the context: digital globalization, mass labor migration, and the symbolic centrality of consumption to youth identity. Migration remittances (contributing 33% of GDP) raised expectations of middle-class life, but not stable opportunities at home. Social media amplified this disjuncture, creating both visibility of “possibility” and visibility of corruption. Political theory often misreads such moments. Grievances are treated as unmet expectations—but this misses the ideological form they assume. In Nepal, youth mobilization has clustered around neoliberal figures like Rabi Lamichhane and Balendra Shah. Their platforms, cloaked in anti-corruption rhetoric, advance privatization, foreign investment, and market-friendly reforms. This is not accidental. As Pierre Bourdieu suggested, when existing institutions fail to convert aspirations into mobility, actors gravitate toward conservative or market-oriented solutions that promise efficiency and meritocracy (Bourdieu, 1998). Thus, Nepal’s youth politics—while born of real frustrations—is paradoxically channeling itself into projects that reproduce the inequalities of global capitalism rather than dismantling them.

The Crisis of the Left

The republican Left—particularly the CPN-UML and Maoist Centre—squandered a historic opportunity after 2015. Rather than institutionalizing land reform or public ownership, they were consumed by factionalism and populist coalitionism (Prasad, 2025). Their moral credibility collapsed. Yet even in this decline, their record in reducing inequality and poverty remains globally significant. The irony is stark: the Left’s tangible material successes are erased in public discourse, while their failures dominate memory. The protests become “another stick to beat the Left with.” The weakness of the Left created a vacuum now filled by three forces: neoliberal populists, Hindu monarchists with Indian backing, and Western NGOs with democracy-promotion agendas. The military, traditionally sympathetic to monarchy, looms in the background as arbiter. Youth energies are thereby re-articulated within these conservative projects, despite being mobilized in the name of liberation.

Youth Politics and Conservative Turns

Globally, youth movements are often assumed to be progressive. Yet, as Karl Mannheim argued, generational politics depends not on age but on how cohorts are mobilized within ideological structures (Mannheim, 1952). Nepal demonstrates this clearly: grievances of unemployment and corruption are real, but their articulation takes a conservative turn, valorizing neoliberal or monarchist alternatives. This points to a deeper analytical lesson: the politics of youth aspiration cannot be reduced to unmet expectations. It is about how powerful actors—domestic elites, foreign donors, religious movements—appropriate combustible material for their own projects. Nepal’s Gen Z revolt is thus less an autonomous explosion than a contested field of ideological capture.

Between Progress and Disillusionment

 

Nepal’s present crisis is not simply a failure of development. By material measures, the republic has outperformed the monarchy: poverty has collapsed, inequality has fallen, health indicators have improved. What failed was the translation of these gains into a credible political narrative that could sustain popular hope. When expectations rise faster than systemic capacity to deliver, rebellion occurs. But rebellion does not necessarily lead to emancipation. In Nepal, the achievements of decades of Communist organizing risk being delegitimized, while neoliberal and monarchist currents gain legitimacy. The critical task is thus twofold: To recognize and defend the tangible developmental gains achieved under the republic, rather than allowing them to be erased in ideological struggle. To ask why youth politics, globally as in Nepal, so often gravitates toward conservative forms, and how Left movements might reorganize to redirect that energy toward structural transformation rather than market fundamentalism or religious revivalism. Until then, Nepal’s “Gen Z revolt” will remain a reminder that material progress without political transformation breeds not stability, but new contradictions.

References

 Asian Development Bank. (2022). Nepal: Country Poverty Analysis. Manila: ADB.

Bourdieu, P. (1998). Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market. New York: The New Press.

Prasad, V. (2025). Five theses on the situation in Nepal. Peoples Dispatch.

International Labour Organization (ILO). (2024). Global Employment Trends for Youth. Geneva: ILO.

Oxfam Report: Fighting Inequality in Nepal, 2019

Mannheim, K. (1952). Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

World Bank. (2006). Nepal - Resilience amidst conflict: an assessment of poverty in Nepal, 1995-96 and 2003-04. Washington DC: